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Abstract: Internet of Things (IoT) gains popularity in recent times due to its ﬂexibility, usability, diverse applicability and ease of
deployment. However, the issues related to security is less explored. The IoT devices are light weight in nature and have low
computation power, low battery life and low memory. As incorporating security features are resource expensive, IoT devices are
often found to be less protected and in recent times, more IoT devices have been routinely attacked due to high proﬁle security
ﬂaws. This paper aims to explore the security vulnerabilities of IoT devices particularly that use Low Power Wide Area Networks
(LPWANs). In this work, LoRaWAN based IoT security vulnerabilities are scrutinised and loopholes are identiﬁed. An attack was
designed and simulated with the use of a predictive model of the device data generation. The paper demonstrated that by predicting
the data generation model, jamming attack can be carried out to block devices from sending data successfully. This research will
aid in the continual development of any necessary countermeasures and mitigations for LoRaWAN and LPWAN functionality of
IoT networks in general.
1 Introduction
The term “Internet of Things" (IoT) is an oft-bandied term that refers
to a series of many interconnected smart devices with myriad dif-
ferent functions. Such devices have seen an explosion in popularity
and public awareness, due in no small part to the various technology
centric headlines that have appeared over the years concerning the
security of these devices. Various Low Power Wide Area Networks
(LPWANs) have emerged in an attempt to tackle the ongoing IoT
security problem, but major security issues still remain, with many
attacks being fairly trivial to execute against these devices. Since IoT
device adoption shows no rate of slowing down, these security issues
and any related attacks must be properly analysed and assessed, so
that progress can be made to improve the protocols and standards
that form the basis of these device ecosystems. Many IoT device
standards are far from mature and thoroughly tested, so extreme care
must be taken when choosing to implement an IoT network solution,
as security must be at the forefront of any IoT deployment.
LPWANs are an attempt to assuage the many operational con-
cerns present with current IoT infrastructure, e.g., enabling devices
to send small amount of data over longer distance at low power.
According to Cisco, LPWANs accounted for 7% of global Machine-
to-Machine communications worldwide in 2016, with that predicted
to rise to around 31% by 2021 [1]. Long Range Wide Area Net-
work (LoRaWAN) is a popular open standard supported by LoRa
Alliance∗ and is essentially an effective LPWAN protocol. Therefore
it is important, if not obvious, to understand the potential vulnerabil-
ities of LoRaWAN.
The aim of this work is to carefully evaluate the security mech-
anisms in place in a LoRaWAN network, and whether this security
may be compromised effectively in any way. We propose an exper-
imental infrastructure using physical IoT boards and established
network, i.e., by sending data from two SODAQ ExpLoRer IoT
∗https://lora-alliance.org/
boards† to the ThingPark network, with an indoor LoRaWAN gate-
way serving as the attacker attempting to gain information and
identify potential attack vectors to disrupt network operations. Moti-
vation of the the work is based on the existence of vulnerability of
predictability of the slots of data sending by a device to the gateway.
Since the sending slots of a device can be analysed and be predicted
in a single channel communication, jamming attacks are realised to
be possible.
While this paper outlined and discussed the general attacks that
have plagued IoT devices and networks in recent times, our focus
is on attacks that can be speciﬁcally applied to LoRaWAN. Such
attacks and security operations of LoRaWAN are outlined and
evaluated in this paper. Fundamental operations of device inter-
connectivity are analysed, along with various attacks that can be
applied due to any failings inherent to the design of LoRaWAN.From
this analysis, a justiﬁcation of approach is deﬁned, which outlines
and gives evidence for taking any particular directions, as well as
providing predictions and set deliverable. Main contributions of this
work are:
• Proposing a framework to determine packet snifﬁng and eaves-
dropping in building attack proﬁles for a target LoRaWAN
device, which is achieved by analysing the trafﬁc and iden-
tifying exploitable trends.
• Compare the effectiveness of continuous and targeted DoS
attacks on IoT devices in a LoRaWAN environment.
• Proposition for remedies to the attack scenarios carried out,
and discussion on the implications of such mitigations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discuss
about the Internet of Things and relevant security concerns in IoT,
Section 3 describes about the low powered LoRa and LoRaWAN
along with its operational steps. It is followed by Section 4 to analyse
the LoRaWAN security and known attacks in details. Experimental
Framework, Data Collection and methods of Analysis are discussed
†https://support.sodaq.com/Boards/ExpLoRer/
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in Section 5 and Section 6 presents the proposed prediction based
jamming model along with the list of attack models. It is followed
by discussion on the success and failure of the jamming attacks in
Section 7 and followed by conclusion in Section 8.
2 Internet of Things and Security Concerns
2.1 Internet of Things and Applications
The Internet of Things is the rapidly growing trend of intercon-
necting many various types of devices to the internet. Devices in
the Internet of Things range from sensing and actuation devices for
use in industries including manufacturing and medical, to everyday
home devices like televisions, thermostats, and security systems.
As we move into the future with all our devices interconnected in
this way, the advent of smart homes and cities, which can commu-
nicate together to save energy by way of advanced monitoring, as
well as facilitating increased control, and greater user accessibility,
becomes a reality. The act of devices communicating in this way is
known as Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communications [2] deﬁne
M2M as "communication (that) occurs among machines with com-
puting/communication capabilities without human intervention".
This future of fully automated smart ecosystems could become
reality a lot sooner than we may think. According to the research
and advisory ﬁrm Gartner, 8.38 billion IoT devices were connected
in 2017, with that set to rise to over 20 billion devices by 2020, this
represents a greater than twofold increase in IoT device adoption in
the space of just 3 years [3].
Aside from the home automation and monitoring purposes that
have become increasingly more prevalent in general consumer use,
one of the fastest rising and main proposed applications of IoT tech-
nology is in industrial environments. IoT technology has been devel-
oped and deployed for various industries, including; environmental
monitoring, healthcare, inventory and production management, food
supply, and transportation [4]. The UK government has also commit-
ted to driving IoT development and adoption through their IoTUK
programme, which aims to achieve goals including smart bus stops
with sensors/beacons, and mobile applications that allows people to
"check-in" to their bus stop to let bus drivers know they are waiting
for service, as well as medical applications like diabetes manage-
ment, and dementia care [5].
2.2 Security Concerns in IoT Based Network
As with any interconnected network of devices, security is a
paramount concern, but it is more challenging with the IoT mainly
because the end devices are low powered and have limited compu-
tation power. As these networks grow, with more sensing devices
being added at accelerated rates, not only does the amount of data
being generated increase, but also the security risk associated with
such growth increases proportionally. Talwana & Hua [6] pointed
that a breach in an IoT network is unlike other high proﬁle hacking
episodes, which usually aim to compromise online data and pri-
vacy. Instead, IoT device insecurity can open up a gateway for the
entire network to be compromised. Compromising a private key or
a session key could be harder compared to a simple but effective
attacks like replay attack and ack spooﬁng, which could happen in
a low powered WAN like LoRa [7]. The same group of authors also
explored another set of vulnerability in which a malicious gateway
can be created and integrate into a network using a UDP spooﬁng
attacks [7], which is highly possible in LoRa due to dependant on
a gateway to connect to internet. It is interesting to note that an
ack frame can be spoofed and use for acknowledging older or other
data frames through the gateway, the only challenge could be using
the right frame number if used. The traditional issue of a Denial of
Service or Distributed Denial of Service attacks remains an open
challenge in such low powered LoRa networks too.
With this in mind, the explosive growth of connected IoT devices
should be a cause of real concern and trepidation, especially due
to the potential usage of less mature standards that facilitate these
communications. This is in contrast to time tested protocols, like
the TCP/IP suite, that more traditional internetworking devices are
built upon. Moganedi & Mtsweni [8] outlined that while IoT devices
can introduce great convenience into human life, if the mass amount
of personal data that can be collected are not secured or improp-
erly protected against being leaked, any desire to adopt or use such
technology will wane and the potential and the ability of what IoT
devices can do will be less explored.
In a similar vein to Mirai, a new malware known as "Bricker-
bot" began targeting devices in a similar fashion. The difference
this time, was that Brickerbot actually rendered devices unusable
so that they couldn’t be leveraged for use in DDoS attacks, hence
the name. According to Mansﬁeld Devine [9], the following weeks
after the initial Brickerbot assault, updated versions started to appear
which targeted different protocols and interfaces, rendering even
more devices irrecoverably unusable. With so many devices now
connected, as well as even the most conservative estimates predict-
ing adoption rates of IoT devices to increase exponentially in the
near future [1], one would be forgiven for thinking that the future
of IoT security may seem bleak with the far too frequent reports of
security issues arising around these technologies.
On the subject of the wariness of IoT device adoption, any sim-
ple online search yields numerous headlines that detail massive
security ﬂaws with IoT devices. Hackers at the DEF CON∗ secu-
rity conference in 2016 found 47 new vulnerabilities in 23 IoT
devices, including vulnerabilities with smart door locks, padlocks,
thermostats, refrigerators, and even wheelchairs [10]. While many
of these devices are consumer based ones not meant for industrial
applications, such regular reports on the security concerns of these
devices can sour public opinion of their use, which could ultimately
slow down adoption rates. It seems until a common standardisa-
tion of IoT device communication protocols and security emerges,
whether for commercial or industrial use devices, there will con-
tinue to be headlines of security breaches and hacking attempts made
against the IoT.
The most recent and high proﬁle attack that leveraged IoT devices
was the Mirai botnet attack, which was used to cripple the services
of large online companies, including web host and cloud provider
OVH, as well as DNS service provider Dyn, which in turn affected
the operation of popular sites like Twitter, Netﬂix, Reddit, and
Github [11]. The main concerning factor of Mirai is in the sim-
plicity of its operation. Kolias et al. [11] outlined Mirai operation
thusly, ﬁrst, Mirai scans random public IP addresses through TCP
ports 23 or 2323. Next, the malware engages in a brute-force attack
in an effort to discover which of the 62 possible hard-coded user-
name and password pairs match for the device. When shell access
has been gained, the Mirai loader software downloads the malware
to the infected device and attempts to protect itself from other mal-
ware by shutting down ports such as Telnet and SSH. From this point
onward, the infected device may attempt to infect other devices on
the network, as well as compete in Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks against IP addresses speciﬁed by the Botmaster. The
fact that Mirai could infect so many devices shows the sorry state
of consumer IoT device security so far. It becomes quickly appar-
ent that many IoT device manufacturers release their products to
the market with woefully insecure default administrator credentials
across all their devices, as well as having unnecessary network ports
open that help facilitate these attacks.
Other form of attacks are Malware attacks and in recent times a
high proﬁle of such attacks on IoT devices has occurred e.g., Mirai,
and Brickerbot. It’s not an unreasonable suggestion that security
world could be heading towards a potentially devastating Stuxnet-
like scenario in the near future. Such issues are exacerbated by the
fact that deployed IoT devices, whether in domestic locations or
∗https://www.defcon.org/
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industrial plants, rarely see ﬁrmware updates of any kind often, or
even at all. As noted by Teng et al. [12], if automatic updates are
unavailable, that only leaves the option of a manual ﬁrmware update,
which can be extensively time consuming (especially if the user is
dealing with a large network of devices), as well as being error prone
and potentially difﬁcult. In an industrial setting, devices are gen-
erally deployed for long periods of time, and so, must be resilient
to drastic changes and able to adapt to the ever changing security
landscape. If software patches/updates aren’t pushed out frequently
enough, or indeed ever, the security threat posed to the network could
outweigh the beneﬁts of IoT device integration.
Security challenges threats and solutions are highlighted by [13]
and [14], regarding replay attack, jamming attack, buffer reservation
attack, spooﬁng attacks etc in IoT networks. Khan, M.A. et al. [13],
also suggest Blockchain as a solution with a hope to secure data,
prevent data hijacking attack, unauthorized access, man-in-middle
attack and for maintaining data integrity. The authors [15], suggest
to use a random number in a join procedure of a LoRaWAN pro-
tocol to avoid replay attack and tested the performance by using
jammer and avoiding jammer. Knowing the packet generation pat-
tern will have no impact if a jammer is used to jammed the entire
channel continuously. In speciﬁc context to LoRa, Eldefrawy, M.
et al.[16] conduct an extensive formal analysis to understand the
vulnerabilities of LoRa network of LoRaWAN v1.0 and v1.1. It is
found that LoRaWAN attacks on Niagree (non-injective agreement
claim) and Nisynch (non- injective synchronization) attacks occurs
in LoRAWAN v1.0 end devices, but in LoRaWAN v1.1 those vul-
nerabilities are patched. However, the vulnerability test conducted.
Every wireless communication technology is susceptible to interfer-
ence and jamming attacks. Eldefrawy, M. et al. [16] think that threat
of signal jamming is not a serious issue because LoRa spread the use
of wireless communication channels to a wider band unlike Blue-
tooth, Near Field Communication etc. However, even in presence of
multi channel, selective jamming attacks cannot be prevented if the
attacher knows the channel in which the device is sending and if the
device communicates using a same ﬁxed channel. In presence of a
wide spread multi channels, LoRaWAN can use different channels
for a same end device, so selective channel jamming may not harm
all the transmitted data because some data taking different chan-
nel will eventually be delivered. Can an attacker learn the pattern at
which the data is send by a device and know the pattern at which the
device switches its channel? If so, can the attacker jam the channel
only when the the data is on transit knowing the pattern of sending
and knowing the channels used, which is the motivation of this work.
2.3 Other Current Security Challenges
One of the main reasons for why there’s been no widely
applied/adopted solution to IoT security, is due to the majority of
these devices requiring low power computation to achieve optimum
operating efﬁciency and lack of security. The trade-off with this, is
that the devices are mostly incapable of utilising intensive and secure
encryption methods, among many other factors.
LoRaWAN adopts Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) method
for ensuring data conﬁdentiality, which is a symmetric block
cipher algorithm known for its efﬁciency and its fast and strong
algorithm [17], AES can be implemented via hardware and soft-
ware. Bui, Puschini, Bacles-Min, Beigné, & Tran [18] outlined that
while AES is designed to beneﬁt from software optimisation in mod-
ern computing systems, software implementation of AES introduces
data processing and transmission delay, as well as an increase in
power and energy consumption. Hardware implementations can pro-
vide high performance and throughput, but suffers from the same
issue of high power consumption, which can be detrimental to IoT
device operation.
In order to ensure data conﬁdentiality and privacy, LoRa adopts
encryption, however, many are attempting to designing methods that
will consume minimal power with least computation. The traditional
AES encryption consumes too much computation and power for low
powered end devices. Thus, ([19]), proposes an AES model in which
the number of encryption cycles are reduced in order to compensate
the power loss at the end devices. The new method also incorporated
techniques to avoid replay attack, known-key and eavesdropping
attacks. However, reducing the number of encryption cycles means
that its less secure, but providing security is always better than open
end connection. The same authors i.e., Tsai, K.L. et al. [20] also
designed another variant of AES encryption method for LoRaWAN
in 2019.
Bui et al. [18] stated that lightweight block cipher algorithms
have begun to emerge recently. These algorithms are lightweight
in their software and hardware implementations and result in lower
memory footprints, but come with the trade-off of reduced security
levels. Examples of such algorithms include "PRESENT" and "CLE-
FIA". Both of these implementations use more encryption rounds
and smaller block sizes than AES, which leads to lower through-
put. However, these lightweight algorithms are not yet adopted in
new IoT proposals due to insufﬁcient studies in terms of security
and protocols [18]. Ensuring privacy and data conﬁdentiality from
end-devices to gateway is good, however, ensuring privacy between
end-devices to application server directly is a better option, because
higher the number of hops higher is the risk (more attacking points).
So, providing data and communication security should be provided
from end-to-end i.e., from end-devices to the LoRaWAN gateway to
the Network Server to the Application server, however, computation
power and energy requirement for the computation will be a daunt-
ing tasks because end-devices are generally lightweight in nature.
One such system is designed by [21]. In a normal LoRaWANmodel,
AppSKey key is used separately for securing between a Network
server and an Application server.
3 Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN)
With the focus on Long Range Wide Area Network(LoRaWAN)
security, in this section we brieﬂy discussed LPWAN the background
of LoRaWAN that leads to further security analysis in the following
sections.
3.1 Low Power Wide Area Networks (LPWAN)
The main characteristics of a Low Power Wide Area Networks
(LPWAN) network include ultra low-power operation of nodes to
reduce costs and environmental impact of frequently changing bat-
teries, the network should not require nodes towake up unless there’s
a need to send or receive data (the ALOHA system), and data trans-
fer should be fully secured [22]. Many well established and utilised
LPWAN technologies already exist in the wireless IoT communica-
tions space, including LoRaWAN, Sigfox, Weightless-W, N and P,
and DASH7. SigFox is perhaps one of the most commonly adopted
LPWAN solutions next to LoRaWAN [23].
According to Silva et al. [24] the most glaring issues with SigFox
in comparison to LoRaWAN, is the restrictive data rate uplink limit
of 100b/s, a maximum packet payload of 12 bytes, and the number of
packets per end device cannot exceed 14 packets a day. Due to these
drawbacks and limitations imposed by SigFox, LoRaWAN seems the
more robust option to explore in this paper. The LoRa Alliance out-
line the data rate of LoRaWAN as 250b/s - 50kb/s, with an unlimited
amount of messages per day allowed to be sent by devices [25].
Despite the many LPWAN solutions available from different
organisations and vendors, the focus of this work is to be turned
to the particular IoT network that is the open source LoRa net-
work due its popularity. To facilitate maximum low power operation
of devices, LoRaWAN aims to optimise every aspect of device
communication.
3.2 LoRa and LoRaWAN
At this juncture it is important to understand the distinction between
LoRa (Long Range) and LoRaWAN (Long Range Wide Area Net-
work). LoRa deﬁnes the physical layer wireless radio modulation
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Fig. 1: Example LoRaWAN session.
used to create the long range communication link. Unlike certain
legacy devices that use Frequency Shifting Key (FSK) physical layer
modulation, LoRa uses Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS) modulation to
maintain the same low power characteristics of FSK, while signiﬁ-
cantly increasing the range of communications [25]. Depending on
the region, LoRa can operate on the 868 (EU), 433 (EU), 915 (US),
or 430 (AS) MHz ISM bands.
LoRaWAN in contrast, deﬁnes the communication protocol
as well as the underlying system architecture for the network.
LoRaWAN is especially important due to it being the deciding factor
in determining the power consumption, and in turn, the battery life
of a node, the capacity of the LPWAN network, the quality of ser-
vice (QoS), and perhaps most crucially, the security and variety of
the network applications [25]. While LoRa modulation technology
is proprietary, LoRaWAN is an open standard in active development
by the LoRa Alliance.
3.3 LoRaWAN Overview and Operation
As shown in Figure 1, the nodes in a LoRaWAN network are not
primarily associated with a speciﬁc gateway, data transmitted by a
node is typically received by multiple gateways. Upon receiving the
data from the node, the gateway forwards the packets to the cloud-
based network server via traditional network standards like Ethernet,
Cellular, and Wiﬁ. This network server will handle any intelligence
and complexity, and will perform any needed ﬁltering, security, and
scheduling tasks [25]. The network server also performs the Adap-
tive Data Rate (ADR) needed for optimising the data rate and energy
consumption of nodes in the network.
LoRaWAN divides devices into classes depending on what
requirements the end device needs to serve. The classes trade off
network downlink communication latency versus battery lifetime.
Class A devices are grouped as battery powered sensors, which are
the most energy efﬁcient and must be supported by all devices on
the network. Class B devices are known as battery powered actu-
ators, which are energy efﬁcient with latency controlled downlink,
and ﬁnally, Class C devices are known as main powered actuators,
since these devices don’t run off of a battery, they can afford to listen
constantly with no latency for downlink communications [25].
4 LoRaWAN Security and Known Attacks
LoRaWAN utilises AES-128 encryption for secure end-to-end
encryption of exchanged application payloads between end-devices
and application servers. However, Na et al. [26] revealed that dur-
ing the Over The Air Authentication (OTAA) join method, in which
an end-device and network server exchange messages to initiate
the joining procedure, the join request message sent from the end-
device, through the gateway to the network server, is un-encrypted.
The authors theorised if an attacker were able to collect enough join
request messages of certain end-devices and determined the optimal
time to attack the target, they may initiate a replay attack in which
the attacker sends a constant stream of the collected join request
messages, leading the network server to attempt to connect with the
attacker device, and discarding the request messages of each targeted
end-device.
In addition to replay attacks, LoRaWAN is susceptible to many
other security ﬂaws and attacks, including weaknesses in key man-
agement, counter management, bit ﬂipping attacks, eavesdropping,
and encryption ﬂaws [27]. Due to the coexistence issues faced in
LoRaWAN, Denial of Service (DoS) can also occur if messages col-
lide, although little research has been carried out with regards to DoS
attacks in LoRaWAN, outside of replay attacks. This section aims to
provide a much greater, and more in depth analysis of these security
ﬂaws and attacks which are also experimentally validated.
4.1 LoRaWAN Keys Evaluation
Devices on a LoRaWAN network have a session with the network
server. Typically, this session contains the device address, and two
session keys (NwkSKey and AppSKey). Frame counters count the
number of uplink and downlink messages in the session. An Uplink
message is a message from a device to an application, whereas a
downlink is the opposite [28]. Since the network server can also
incorporate the application server, two scenarios are depicted (as
shown in Figure 1) to capture the real world application scenarios
according to the LoRaWAN v1.1∗.
Since LoRaWAN is a radio protocol, capturing transmitted mes-
sages is a trivial matter. However, it is impossible to read these
messages without the AppSKey, as the message is encrypted. Tam-
pering is also not possible without the NwkSKey, as the MIC
(Message Integrity Check) will fail.
Keys differ depending on which activation method was utilised,
with the available options being OTAA (Over The Air Activation)
and ABP (Activation By Personalisation). The session keys and app
key all have a length of 128 bits [28].
ABP keys:
• NwkSKey: Network Session Key. Used for identiﬁcation and
message integrity.
• AppSKey:Application Session Key. Used for payload encryp-
tion/decryption. Unless Fport is set to 0, then NwkSKey is
used instead [27].
• DevAddr: Device Address. Used for identifying the device
within the network
These keys are manually assigned to the devices in ABP. The
advantage of this is the devices can begin sending data immediately
upon power up, as well as if keys are stolen, the affected device
can be easily deprovisioned without having to change all the other
devices. However, having to keep track of frame counters for the
messages between the device and network server between power
cycles is a downside of this. The server will usually ignore messages
with frame counters that differ from expectations, but this is usually
disabled in testing environments.
OTAA keys:
• AppEUI: Application Identiﬁer - Uniquely identiﬁes the
application
∗https://lora-alliance.org/resource-hub/lorawanr-speciﬁcation-v11
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• DevEUI: End Device Identiﬁer - Uniquely identiﬁes the
device
• AppKey: Used to derive the session keys (NwkSKey and
AppSKey)
OTAA uses an application ID (AppEUI) and device ID (DevEUI)
along with an application key (AppKey) to derive the network ses-
sion key (NwkSKey), application session key (AppSKey), and the
device address. The device address is dynamically assigned by the
network.
When the end device is powered up, a join procedure is initiated
where the negotiation of a new set of keys based on the application
key is performed. After the negotiation, which usually takes around
5 seconds, the device behaves just like an ABP device. If the device
is powered off, the join procedure must occur again. The biggest
weakness with this method is the application key (AppKey), if this
is stolen, an attacker can impersonate any device in the network.
Key management using OTAA is much easier however, and has the
beneﬁt of key regeneration upon each new join procedure, something
ABP lacks.
4.2 Encryption and Protocol Vulnerability
Message encryption in LoRaWAN is performed using AES128 in
CTR mode. As previously outlined, the AppSKey is used for the
encryption of the payload, unless the FPort is set to 0, then the
NwkSKey is used instead. AES is a symmetric encryption algorithm,
this means the sender (the sensor node) and receiver (the network
server) use the same key to encrypt and decrypt the messages. The
glaring downside of this, is if an attacker can obtain the symmetric
key, all messages encrypted with that key can be read.
In LoRaWAN, a block cipher mode is used. The encryption is
performed as follows, a keystream is produced using the FCntUp or
FCntDown values, then, the plaintext frame payload is XOR’d with
the keystream to produce the ciphertext, i.e., Ciphertext = Payload
⊕ Keystream. Information such as the FPort and counters are sent
unencrypted.
The issue with this method, is the use of the counters in the
keystream instead of a cryptographic nonce. A nonce in cryptog-
raphy is any random or pseudo-random arbitrary number that is used
once, the counters used may increment and change on every message
sent, but forcing the node to restart and rejoin the network would
reset the counters to 0. In this case, an attacker would have knowl-
edge of the current values of the counters, due to the linear way in
which they increment. This could potentially lead to some identiﬁ-
able, regular patterns in the resulting ciphertext.
If a situation arose where the counters didn’t increment, or if the
node was forced to rejoin the network and reset its counter values, a
potential attacker who already had knowledge of the plaintext for
one message could XOR the known plaintext with the ciphertext
to reproduce the keystream [27]. Figure 2 displays how this could
operate.
4.3 Replay Attack Analysis
Despite the need for certain session keys to tamper with packets, it’s
still possible for an attacker to retransmit these captured messages,
known as a replay attack. These kinds of attacks may be detected
and blocked by using frame counters. Upon initial device activation,
both frame counters, FCntUp and FCntDown, are set to 0, whenever
an end device transmits an uplink message, the FCntUp counter is
incremented, and every time the network sends a downlink message,
the FCntDown is incremented [28]. If the device or network server
receives a message with a frame counter lower than the last one, the
message is dropped.
Fig. 2: Counter reset on forced rejoin
Frame counters reset to 0 upon every power cycle of a device.
For ABP activated devices, this can be an issue when in the develop-
ment stage, as some IoT platforms, like The Things Network (TTN),
will discard messages and require the device to be re-registered.
Based on initial testing, the ThingPark development mode seems to
have this particular feature disabled, as devices don’t need to be re-
registered upon power cycle to continue sending messages. Due to
this, it would be possible for an attacker to target some development
environments, although such targets are less critical.
4.4 Bit Flipping Attack Analysis
Bit ﬂipping is another attack that can be utilised in a LoRaWAN
network. A bit ﬂipping attack consists of changing speciﬁc portions
of ciphertext to alter data without the need to decrypt it ﬁrst. Since
devices in a LoRaWAN environment utilise AES in CTR (Counter)
mode, this makes it possible to perform a bit ﬂipping attack as CTR
mode simply performs an XOR logical operation for encryption of
the plaintext [29]. The XOR operation keeps the order of the plain-
text bits, the unshufﬂed nature of this enables the use of bit ﬂipping
attacks.
As outlined in Section 4.1, an attacker would need the network
session key to also tamper with the MIC, as failure to change the
MIC would result in a MIC mismatch and the packet being dropped.
Figure 3 displays the process of a bit ﬂipping attack failing due to a
difference in MIC.
Since the only way to change the MIC would be to physically
extract the network session key from the nodes, this method of
attack is unlikely to occur in reality. Message integrity isn’t checked
between the network server and the application server, however;
these two roles are often incorporated as a single device.
4.5 Eavesdropping/Reconnaissance Attack Analysis
Due to the fact that LoRaWAN is a radio protocol, capturing poten-
tially large and varied amounts of data would be a trivial matter for
any attackers within proximity of the sending nodes. An attacker in
this situation would need a device capable of snifﬁng LoRaWAN
packets and storing them for later analysis, as well as being knowl-
edgeable about the data types and formats utilised in LoRaWAN.
Collecting numerous LoRaWAN messages, though the payload is
encrypted, is a great way to gather information about the network
and the devices on it. After enough data has been collected, it may
be possible to apply certain techniques to analyse the encrypted data,
like machine learning applications to identify trends and regularities.
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–13
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2019 5
Fig. 3: Bit ﬂipping failure attack due to MIC difference
Aside from the encrypted data, LoRaWAN packets leave much valu-
able information unencrypted, including frame counter values and
device addresses. This data could be used to plot attacks and proﬁle
target devices.
Speciﬁcally, the data gathered by eavesdropping communications
in this way could aid in choreographing DoS attacks in LoRaWAN.
Having knowledge of message types, message arrival times, and
sequence numbers, potentially enables an attacker to plan and exe-
cute such attacks. To understand more about how this could work,
Section 4.6 outlines the operation of DoS attacks in LoRaWAN
networks.
4.6 Threat Model: Denial of Service in LoRaWAN
Denial of Service is an area that appears grossly underrepresented
in various research papers that outline attacks on LoRaWAN and
similar LPWAN technologies. The main documented method of per-
forming DoS attacks in LoRaWAN is via use of signal jamming and
replay attacks. Aras et al. [30], focused on the effect that the Spread-
ing Factor plays in jamming devices on a LoRaWAN network, but
limited the attacks to a device sending on a single channel. The duty
cycles used by a device in LoRaWAN will depends on whether the
device uses single channel or multiple channels. If a single chan-
nel is used then the device can set to uses n time units for every
m times unit where n<m, and the free slots are made available for
other devices. When an end device operates on multi-channel, then
in channel 1, the ﬁrst n slots can be used for the ﬁrst message and
then use the (n+p) slots for the second message and so on for other
channels for every m times unit where n=p and n or p < m. The
main difference with other form of wireless communication say in
WiFi radio communication is that WiFi radio works on carrier sense
multiple access collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) where the partici-
pating devices competes for the channel and if collision occurs then
an access attempt is made after a random amount of time. It means
that it will be very hard to predict the channel access pattern of a
device due to adoption of random access patten, so jamming the data
generated by a particular device without jamming the entire channel
will be next to impossible. Thus the nature of predictive jamming
attacks on a particular device data generation in LoRaWAN andWiFi
are different in nature. Taking such behaviour into account is impor-
tant to ascertain how DoS attacks could be performed in real world
production scenarios, as opposed to more controlled labs.
Jamming a channel continuously is easy and it will be easy to
detect too if the channel is jammed continuously, however, if jam-
ming is conducted only when the data is about to send or as long
as the data is on transit then it will also jammed successfully, how-
ever, it will be very difﬁcult to learn about the jamming. Thus, the
jamming adopting predictive model will be smooth as well as very
efﬁcient and also act as anti-jammer detection proof. The aim of
this paper is to study such a predictive jamming attack model in
LoRaWAN.
Since LoRaWAN isn’t based on traditional IP network principles,
the process for carrying out these attacks, as well as their remedies,
are less well established. Utilising eavesdropping attacks to gain an
accurate proﬁle on the target device is a method that could be used to
great effect in determining the optimal window of opportunity for an
attack. Since much valuable information is left unencrypted, includ-
ing counters, airtime, channel, and device address, an attacker may
build an accurate proﬁle and tailor their DoS attack appropriately.
Replay attacks, as outlined in section 4.3, can produce a denial
of service if executed correctly. Much work has gone into studying
these attacks, but not other methods of DoS attacks. Despite the low
message and data rate of LoRaWAN devices, it should still be possi-
ble to either overwhelm a gateway, especially an off the shelf indoor
model, as well as blocking messages by sending data at the same
time as a target device. Performing a DoS attack with this method
instead of a replay attack also eliminates the need to reset the target
device, an action unlikely to be achieved in practice if an attacker
does not have physical access to the nodes.
As research has already been performed concerning the DoS
capabilities of replay attacks and the OTAA activation method, but
little to no research has been undertaken that experiments with ABP
activated devices and more traditional DoS methods, the focus for
the experiments in this work will be attempts at DoS attacks with
ABP activated nodes.
4.7 Discussions
While many attacks and protocol overviews have already been dis-
cussed and analysed so far, due to insufﬁcient varied research and
results in this area, Denial of Service attacks used in conjunction
with Eavesdropping attacks will be the focus in this paper from this
point onward. The experiments will aim to build upon some of the
work done by Aras [30], but with less emphasis on the Spreading
Factor, and more on determining the ideal conditions for an attack,
with focus on a more real world scenario, like the normal operational
use of multiple channels. An attempt to implement a solution to such
attacks will also be carried out.
This work is unconcerned with the contents of data such as the
encrypted payload, as much research has already been carried out
regarding this. Instead, it’s the ample amount of data readable by
anyone with a LoRaWAN enabled device that is of particular interest
to this work, as this information is potentially of great consequence
to the security of devices on the network.
To prove this passively collectable data can be used to great effect,
scenarios will be presented in which regular, continuous DoS attacks
will be launched, as well as more precise and targeted DoS attacks.
The aim is to properly demonstrate the dangers of packet snifﬁng in
a LoRaWAN environment, as well as show how easily DoS attacks
may be launched, even by attackers with limited knowledge, thus
proving the inherent weaknesses in the LoRaWAN protocol that still
exist to be ﬁxed.
It is predicted that the careful and thorough analysis of this pas-
sively gathered gateway data will enable the creation of a scenario
in which a perfected, highly accurate and repeatable DoS attack may
be carried out to great effect. It’s also predicted that small payload
sizes can change the outcome of an attack.
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Based on all the currently analysed information, our quest is
whether LoRaWAN is a secure LPWAN solution resilient to eas-
ily performed attacks. This can be further broken down into four
subcategories:
• How easy is it to gather information on target devices, and how
can this information be used to generate attack scenarios?
• How difﬁcult are DoS attacks to perform based on the infor-
mation gathered, and are there any particular factors that aid
in generating better attack scenarios?
• Should the attacks be successful, what effective countermea-
sures may be implemented?
• Based on the results from the experiments and research,
are LPWANs, speciﬁcally LoRaWAN, a viable solution to
addressing the security concerns faced by IoT devices?
In an attempt to answer the above points, various attack scenar-
ios are carried out in which one LoRaWAN enabled device attempts
to block messages from the other. This will be achieved by use
of a rogue gateway that will passively sniff data for later analysis.
Messages will be sent at variable times and recorded, to identify
exploitable patterns for use in the attacks. Codes are written in the
Arduino IDE and uploaded to the LoRaWAN boards for execu-
tion. A further expansion and explanation on experimental setup and
methods can be found in the following section.
5 Experimental Framework, Data Collection and
Building the Predictive Model
5.1 Experimental Setup
The setup for this scenario involves two SODAQ ExpLoRer boards
and an indoor LoRaWAN gateway. Much of the data are analysed
through the use of the ThingPark wireless logger, as well as the
internal logs kept by the indoor gateway. The gateway is connected
via Ethernet to a basic home router, which then connects to the
ThingPark network server. ThingPark is used as it provides extended
functionality in analysing message types and data.
The gateway must be added manually to the ThingPark devel-
opment environment before messages are forwarded to the wireless
logger. Firewall ports 21, 22, and 2404 must be open for the gateway
to contact the network server correctly. This indoor gateway will be
used as the rogue gateway needed to capture and analyse LoRaWAN
packets.
Since ABP is the method used for the activation of devices in this
scenario, the SODAQ boards must also be conﬁgured for use in the
ThingPark dashboard. The Device Address, Network Session Key,
and Application Session Key are speciﬁed for the device, with these
values being derived from the DevEUI in this instance, although any
random value may be set for these without penalty. Spreading Factor
12 is used for all conﬁgured devices for these experiments.
The Arduino Integrated Development Environment (IDE) is
utilised throughout this paper to upload the sketches to the devices.
Many of these sketches consist of simple methods of pushing vari-
ous data types to the network server. The appropriate session keys
are conﬁgured in the code before compiling. The aim of these sce-
narios is to emulate the conditions in which a small scale LoRaWAN
deployment would operate. This means no real restrictions, apart
from the set locations of the nodes, and their proximity to the gate-
way, are imposed. Devices are also not restricted to any particular
channels, in an attempt to produce a more natural scenario.
The ﬁrst SODAQ ExpLoRer (E1) is acting as the attacker device
in this setup, while the second device (E2) is taking the place of
the target. E1 will attempt to block the communications of E2 by
sending junk messages concurrently as the legitimate messages from
E2. More detailed information about the hardware and software tools
used in this scenario can be found in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
Fig. 4: Tools overview
Fig. 5: Testing equipment, indoor gateway and SODAQ boards
5.2 Passive Data Collection
With the indoor gateway, it is possible to capture any LoRaWAN data
transmitted within range of the device. By exporting this data into a
log ﬁle and applying ﬁlters, an attacker may quickly pick out relevant
information to apply to their attack scenario. The ﬁrst step for an
attacker is to identify the address of the device they wish to perform
the DoS attack against, and then determine the common themes in
transmission that may be exploited. Figure 6 shows a small sample
of the data that the indoor gateway can collect, information like the
device address of the sending device, channel information, spreading
factor, and the FCnt (seq) value are unencrypted and readable by the
attacker.
From these log ﬁles, an attacker could pick any device that reli-
ably sends data at plottable time intervals and centre the denial of
service around that. For example, analysis of these log ﬁles show
the device with the address “002044BE” (E2) is a likely candidate
due to not only the frequency of the sent data, but also the current
frame counter value, which shows the device has been sending data
for a reliable period up to this point. Knowing these details allows
the attacker to create a reliable baseline for the operation of the tar-
get device, so that future predictions can be made which aid in the
execution of the DoS attack.
When enough data has been passively collected and broadly
inspected, the next stage in identifying the correct attack vectors is to
do a much more thorough analysis to identify the exploitable trends
in the device E2’s operation.
5.3 Building the Prediction Model by Analysis Packets
The ﬁrst step in the LoRaWAN packet analysis is accurately deter-
mining the average time elapsed between each message sent by the
target device E2. Having this information correct to the second not
only provides the attacker with knowledge about the optimal win-
dow to attack in, but also enables the prediction of arrival times for
all future messages.
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Fig. 6: Sample indoor gateway log data
Fig. 7: Message delivery time differences for device E2
The data in Figure 7 is produced from a sample of 150 packets
from E2 collected by the indoor gateway. Aside from a few outliers,
the average time between delivered packets for E2 lies at 1.9 min-
utes, or more precisely, 1.994. This works out as exactly 1 Minute
59 seconds 64 milliseconds. With this data, it’s possible to accu-
rately plot all the expected message delivery times for E2 from the
last recorded message. This predicted data can then be compared
against the actual message delivery times to ensure the reliability of
the calculations as shown in the following equation.
PredictedT ime = TargetLastMsg +AvgMsgT ime (1)
If the last recorded message that the rogue gateway picked up was
at 19 : 02 : 48.945, the simple formula above can be used to estimate
the message delivery times for the device E2 for the next hour:
PredictedT ime = 19 : 02 : 48.945 + 00 : 01 : 59.64 (2)
Figure 8 shows the predicted message arrival time utilising the
formula above, next to the actual message arrival time. The pre-
dicted messages have been calculated based on the last received
message at 19 : 02 : 48.945, all results in the graph focus solely on
the millisecond value of the times.
Figure 9 shows a sample of the ﬁrst 10 results from the graph
above. Doing so gives more granular information and shows just
how accurate the predictions were when compared against the actual
message delivery times of E2. Although outliers still exist here with
the values 393 and 396.
6 Proposed Prediction based Jamming Model
With the analysis and the prediction model in the previous section,
we performed two forms of attacks; the ﬁrst is launched against E2
device and in the second attack, E1 is periodically reset.
Fig. 8: Actual millisecond value vs predicted
Fig. 9: Sample of 10 values
6.1 Testing an Attack form 1: Continuous Jamming Attack
The ﬁrst attack to be launched against the E2 device is a continu-
ous DoS attack in which speciﬁc message times are not an issue. To
perform this attack, the SODAQ device E1 will continuously stream
data in the hope that a collision occurs to disrupt the messages sent
from E2. The delay value in the Arduino sketch is set to a single
millisecond, and the payload of the messages will be a consistent 40
bytes. This test takes place over an hour.
The results in Figure 10 show the apparent failure of device E1 to
block any messages from E2 when utilising a continuous stream of
messages. Despite the delay value for the code uploaded to E1 set to
a millisecond, the device only managed to send 11 more messages
than the target device E2. The reason behind the lack of messages
from the device E1, is due to the duty cycle observed by the RN2483
wireless module on the SODAQ boards.
The data in Figure 11 can be analysed to show the time taken
between messages during the continuous message stream over an
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Fig. 10: Messages sent vs blocked over one hour for attack form 1
Fig. 11: Average intervals between messages (mm:ss)
hour. The graph shows that despite the delay value being set to a
millisecond in the code, the average time between messages was
7 seconds. It can also be observed when the duty cycle limit is
enforced, it takes an average of 5.55 Minutes before the E1 can
resume sending burst messages.
For clarity, the burst average is the average time between mes-
sages before the duty cycle limitations are enforced, the duty cycle
average is the time between bursts, and the total average accounts
for all message delay times for E1 in this scenario. All values are in
minutes and seconds.
This initial DoS test conﬁrms E1 is incapable of initiating a
continuous stream of messages without intervention. The next exper-
iment for this section will involve the resetting of the device E1
when the duty cycle limit has been met, doing so will initiate a rejoin
sequence to the network which will reset the timer on the device.
6.2 Testing an Attack form 2: Resetting the Device to
increase sending rate
In this attack, E1 will be reset at the end of each legal message burst
to avoid the wait needed to observe the duty cycle. Doing so will
increase the amount of messages that E1 can send within the same 1
hour period. All other parameters, such as payload size, remain the
same.
Figure 12 shows the number of messages sent by each device, as
well as the amount of dropped messages for the target device E2.
This graph shows a much greater success rate in blocking messages
from E2 than the previous attack scenario, with 25.8% of all E2 mes-
sages dropped. While it would be simple to assume that the increased
success rate of this attack is due to the large increase in sent mes-
sages by E1, the data gathered from the gateway logs displays an
interesting trend pertaining to which messages are blocked and why.
Fig. 12: Messages sent vs blocked over one hour for attack form 2
Fig. 13: Message data sample from attack form 2
Figure 13 displays a sample of data from the gateway log dur-
ing the experiment. From the preliminary calculations performed in
section 5.3, it’s known the device E2 (DevAddr 002044BE) sends
data on average every 1.59.64 minutes. With this in mind, the
expected delivery time of message 822 (FCnt) in the ﬁgure above
would be around 17:34:48.754, due to the last recorded message
from E2 being received at 17:32:49.114.
Instead, every time E1 is reset, 2 uplink and 2 downlink messages
are sent to and from the device in relatively quick succession. It’s
these messages that have taken the slot in which message number
822 from E2 would have occupied. This trend is the same for all 8
dropped messages in this attack scenario, with the most frequently
blocked messages being in between the ﬁrst downlink and the sub-
sequent uplink. This seems to indicate the initial data down and up
messages that are exchanged at the start of the network connection
of a node are the most effective at blocking communications from
other devices.
With such useful time and sequence based information gleaned
early on, the ﬁrst attack launched to conduct continuous jamming
to lead to DoS, presented an interesting ﬁnding and an unexpected
results. The ﬁrst continuous jamming attack didn’t manage to block
any of the messages sent by the target device E2. The reason for
this poor performance was due to the attacker device E1 exceeding
the duty cycle limitation for the 868Mhz ISM band and not able
to understand how the other devices generated the packets. Subse-
quent research found the duty cycle of the 868Mhz ISM band is 1%,
which results in a limited maximum transmission time of 36 seconds
per hour, meaning the device can only “speak” for 36 seconds out of
every operational hour [23]. Since both SODAQ ExpLoRer boards
utilise the LoRaWAN certiﬁed RN2483 transceiver module∗, there’s
no way to change the duty cycle limit on this particular hardware as
the integrated LoRaWAN stack prevents a user from performing any
action that violates the speciﬁcation.
This posed an issue, as to perform a continuous jamming attack,
because messages had to be streamed continuously to have any
∗https://support.sodaq.com/Boards/ExpLoRer/
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–13
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2019 9
chance of blocking the target messages from E2. To overcome this in
the second form of attack, the device was reset manually every time
it reached the duty cycle limit for that session, as this was discovered
as one way of overcoming the hard-coded duty cycle limitation. This
however wasn’t an ideal method of attack, as millisecond level accu-
racy cannot be guaranteed when limited to human reaction times.
Strategically resetting the attacker device allowed for the scenario
to mostly ignore the duty cycle, and successfully block 8 messages
from E2. While messages were successfully blocked for this attack,
the number was still too low to be considered an effective means
of DoS attack. Despite this, useful data was still gathered from this
attack which formed the basis of the logic for the targeted DoS
attack. It was found that all 8 of the successfully blocked messages
in this attack fell between the ﬁrst downlink message and the second
uplink message destined for/from E1 upon every reset, meaning that
these messages were the likely ones able to consistently block target
messages.
6.3 Targeted Jamming for Denial of Service
From the testing carried out in the continuous DoS attacks, it was dis-
covered it takes 8.1 seconds from E1 device restart, to the ﬁrst uplink
message being logged at the gateway in this particular scenario (6
seconds for restart operation + 2.1 seconds message airtime). This
information coupled with the airtime of the ﬁrst downlink message,
and the airtime of the subsequent uplink message creates the basis
for calculating the ideal time to initiate a restart on E1 to perform a
more targeted DoS attack.
The values in Figure 13 show that the airtime for the ﬁrst down-
link message is 1.6 seconds, whereas the uplink after that displays
as 2.1 seconds. By combining the total time from device restart
to ﬁrst uplink (Firstup), the airtime of the ﬁrst downlink mes-
sage (Firstdown), and the airtime of the second uplink message
(Secondup), it’s possible to calculate an accurate window (Attack-
Window) in which to launch the targeted DoS attack. The formula
for this is shown below.
AttackWindow = Firstup + Firstdown + Secondup (3)
Using the values in Figure 13, the attack window is calculated
as (8.1 + 1.6 + 2.1) = 11.8. With the attack window calculated, the
formula from Section 5.3 used to gather the predicted target mes-
sage time can be incorporated to ﬁgure out the exact time to initiate
a restart on E1, so that the expected message from E2 occurs at
the same time at the initial downlink/uplink messages from E1. The
process for working out the attack time is shown below.
AttackT ime = PredictedT ime−AttackWindow (4)
With the attack time calculated, this allows the attacker to perform
a targeted DoS attack with high accuracy. The results from an attack
which utilised these formulas are shown in Figure 14.
As the Figure 14 shows, all messages that E2 sent were blocked
by the targeted messages from E1, producing a perfect Denial of Ser-
vice. The implications of these results are worrying for LoRaWAN
device owners, as anyone with a capable device and gateway may
collect the data needed to choreograph such an attack.
These results show that using the deﬁned formula, it is not only
possible to block every message from the target device, but also
allows the attacker to have granularity in being able to choose pre-
cisely which messages they wish to block at any time.
The formulas proved effective, as all 31 messages sent by E2 in
the space of an hour were able to be blocked. These results not only
conﬁrm the ﬁrst downlink and subsequent uplink messages play an
important role in these attacks, but also that there are sufﬁcient ﬂaws
Fig. 14: Messages Sent vs Blocked over 1 Hour for Targeted Attack
Fig. 15: Message payload size vs air time for E2
in the design of the LoRaWAN protocol. With the gateway unable
to receive messages from any other device while it’s transmitting to
the attacker, it shows this method of calculating the attack times to
ensure the initial downlink and uplink messages coincide with the
arrival of any legitimate messages can be used to great effect.
It should be noted the ﬁrst targeted DoS attack had both the target
and attacker using payloads of 40 bytes (39 bytes with null termi-
nating byte). Having a larger payload size for both devices increased
the air time of all messages, which made the attack much easier to
carry out. Having more air time for messages means they take longer
to transmit, this way, if it takes the target longer to transmit a mes-
sage to the gateway, it increases the chances that the communication
will be cut off by the arrival of the ﬁrst downlink message for the
attacker. This gives a greater margin of error for the attack, as the
attacker does not have to be as precise as if the message sizes dif-
fered dramatically.
Since this was a more controlled lab environment, messages were
uniform, and devices were stationary and within line of sight of the
rogue gateway, which is identiﬁed as being one of the larger weak-
nesses with this study and implementation of attacks. In production
environments, payloads are more likely to often differ, devices may
be moving/mobile, and may be considerable distances away from
gateways. All these factors would play a major role in affecting the
attack scenario and present new challenges to an attacker wishing to
target these devices.
6.4 Targeted Jamming with Variable Payload Size
So far, both devices have had a payload size of 40 bytes. Having
a more variable payload size changes the airtime of the messages
as shown in Figure 15. This change in message airtime is likely to
have a distinct change in the attack window needed to perform a
successful DoS attack. Despite this, the same formula used in all
previous experiments should still result in accurate and consistent
results.
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Fig. 16: Selected values for 4 byte attack
As Figure 15 shows, the change from a 40 byte payload to a 4 byte
payload almost halves the message air time. Less message air time
means a shorter window of attack for the attacking device, which
could lead to more messages being able to slip through. Using the
formulas deﬁned in the previous sections, it is still possible to cal-
culate the attack times for the 4 byte messages from E2. Figure 16
shows the air time values for E1, and the average time between mes-
sages for E2 (analysed from 100 messages). The total time from E1
reset to the ﬁrst message being received is also shown.
When the payload of both the attacker and target device was
reduced to 4 bytes (3 bytes with a null terminating byte) the airtime
for a 4 byte payloads was approximately 1 second less compared
to when the payload was 40 byte. Despite the relatively small dif-
ference, the results backed up the theory about the impact of the
payload size in Section 4.7, with the 4 byte payload targeted DoS
only managing to block 16 out of the total 31 messages from E2.
Results showed that not only did the 1 second less air time make
a huge difference when attempting to block messages, but also that
the predicted message delivery times had to be constantly recalcu-
lated throughout the attack, as they were consistently 1 to 3 seconds
off. Such results are in stark contrast to those found in the previous
section, as one would perhaps expect messages with a much lower
payload size to vary a lot less than those with a 40 byte payload.
While it was predicted the smaller payload size would create an
impact on the results, it was never theorised that it would have this
type of impact. However, the attack could still be deemed as a suc-
cess, as over 50% of the messages were able to be blocked, but the
amount still able to be transmitted is a much higher number than
could ever have been guessed. A potential remedy to this would be
to collect a far larger sample size of messages to see if the average
message interval time can be averaged out to a greater accuracy.
Out of all the attacks and experiments, these results were the most
illuminating, and shows the weaknesses of prediction model used,
as well as the interpretation of some results. The attack is more efﬁ-
cient when there’s greater message airtime because interjecting data
to cause error by one device upon another is higher when the data
size is larger. An element of human error must be factored into these
results as well, since the devices relied on human interventions to
reset the devices, which is unsuited to scenarios that require mil-
lisecond accuracy.
It’s possible that with a more machine perfect, and fully auto-
mated attack system that could continuously read the last message
arrival time and update the attack times accordingly, that the results
for lower payload messages, like the ones experimented with in
the previous section, would exhibit a greater amount of messages
blocked.
As the table 16 shows, values are slightly lower here than in the
other sections due to the lower payload size. Using these values, it’s
possible to attempt another targeted DoS attack to see whether the
reduced payload sizes/air times have any real effect on the results.
The results from this attack are shown below in Figure 17. Both
devices are utilising a payload size of 4 bytes in this scenario.
Despite this, the attack still managed to block 51.6% of the mes-
sages sent by E2. This shows the attack was still mostly successful,
but it’s a far cry from the results seen in Section 6.3. Because of this,
it’s important to design your LoRaWAN IoT solution to be resilient
against such attacks, as the next section attempts to outline.
Fig. 17: Messages sent vs blocked over one hour for targeted attack
(4 byte payload)
Fig. 18: Predicted delivery times vs actual delivery times during 4
byte attack
7 Reﬂection on Success or Failure of Attacks
and Mitigation Technique
As has been proven in the previous sections, it’s possible to effec-
tively block messages by analysing and averaging trends observed in
the logs of the rogue gateway. The targeted DoS attacks have relied
on the intervals between target device messages being fairly regu-
lar in their transmission, but should the delays between messages
be more random and unpredictable in nature, as has already been
demonstrated by the results in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4, it’s likely
that the targeted DoS attack will prove useless.
To test this, the target device E2 has had its code modiﬁed so
that the delay between messages is a random value up to 4 minutes.
With this change, it should be much harder for an attacker to identify
trends in message transmission in which to apply the formula to plot
out the best attack time. A sample of the collected message times
with the random delay value are shown below in Table 19.
The delivery time of packets are different depending on the duty
cycle of each communicating devices and when two or more device
operates on a same channel and the starting time of the duty cycles
are same then a data collision will occur and packet will get loss.
However, if the starting time and ending times of duty cycles of two
or more devices does not overlap then even if the devices use the
same channel, data collision will not occur, thus no loss. Thus no
two devices should transmit at the same time and utilize overlapping
units in the same channel to deliver the packets successfully. As per
things connected policy in "The Things Network" to maintain fair
access, uplink airtime for a device is only 30 seconds per day and the
downlink messages to 10 messages per day. So, the aim is to under-
stand when are those times when a device is active. If random access
attempt is used, then it becomes impossible to conduct a predictive
jamming model to block packets. If a device uses multi-channel for
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–13
c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2019 11
Fig. 19: Sample of 10 messages with random delay
transmitting data in such a way that ﬁrst data uses channel 1 and
the following next data uses different channel then, it will be very
hard to blocked or jammed all the data because the jammer needs
to know pattern of channel hopping and the respective slots used
in each channel. However, since the header information about the
source and the destination are generally not encrypted, it will not be
hard to learn the slots and channel used by a device. So, conducting a
predictive jamming for a device using multi-channel is also possible.
Given the more erratic nature of the message delay times, it’s
impossible to calculate an accurate average time between the tar-
get messages for use with the attack formula. Due to this, it’s also
impossible to perform the same type of targeted DoS attack here
performed in previous sections. Since a 1-3 second message interval
difference was enough to skew results in the previous section, such
signiﬁcant and varied delays, as demonstrated here, is more than
enough to completely eliminate the precise time window needed to
perform these targeted DoS attacks. The interesting fact is that when
a predictive jamming is conducted, it is not even necessary to con-
duct a jamming for the whole data length, because jamming for any
fraction of the data length will lead to erroneous data and dropping
of the packet by the gateway. When a predictive based jamming is
used, it may be hard to detect if a jammer is on action, however, con-
tinuous generation of erroneous packets can lead to a suspicion of a
jamming activity by the gateway. So, a mitigation technique could
be an observation by the gateway to check the rate of loss of packet
due to abnormal erroneous nature.
Due to the unique way in which LoRaWAN operates, and
LPWANs in general, the typical countermeasures used to stop DoS
attacks on IP networks can’t be applied here. Because of this, mea-
sures such as the random delay demonstrated above have to be
implemented as a proof of concept at the least, even if the end result
turns out to not be particularly practical in a production environment.
Further discussions and conclusions on all the results presented in
this report so far will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
8 Conclusions
IoT technology is adopted by different sector including medi-
cal (heath monitoring, device monitoring and management), smart
house/building, smart city and emergency systems to mention few
areas. The main reasons of adopting such technology is due to ease
in deployment, ﬂexibility, ease in data collection and so on. How-
ever, security is the area which is least addressed in IoT technology
because the end devices are low powered and have low compu-
tation and memory power, on the other hand introducing security
dimension leads to complexity in design, needs high computation
power and compromised battery life which make it prone to security
attacks. In this work, it is found that in LoRaWAN, resetting of a
device leads to higher data delivery rate and increases the chances of
blocking the medium access rights of neighbour device. By under-
standing the Airtime and uptime of a device E2, an attack window
can be created to perform a predictive jamming attack using actual
data by other device E1 to increase the chances of blocking packet
delivery of E2. It is also found that when the payload size of a packet
is small, the chances of blocking packets reduces. In order to conduct
a successful attack, it is vital to understand the payload of a packet,
duty cycle time and its duration. However, when the duty cycle time
and duration of the slot occupancy changes with a varying payload
size of a packet makes it hard to make an accurate prediction to block
packets. It will make it harder to attack if different devices operates
in different channels.
In future, we intend to study the impact on prediction model
when the number of devices in the network increases and it will be
interesting to study the prediction model when medium access pat-
tern is random and duty cycle and utilization of the slots changes.
Moreover, in future a predictive model for jamming a device using
multi-channel will also be designed.
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